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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The increased public awareness of the risks and hazards of
modern technologies has led to a variety of regulatory actions
to reduce detrimental effects of development and production
processes on human health, safety, and psychological well-being.
These regulatory actions incl~de market approaches (incentives,
taxes), standards, and direct intervention. Among these regu-
latory tools standard setting has emerged as the most practical
and commonly used means for reducing risks and hazards of
environmental pollution. Since the late sixties environmental
and regulatory agencies allover the world have issued numer-
ous standards, for example on S02 emissions from coal fired
power plants, on ambient BOD (biological oxygen demand) levels
in rivers and lakes, on noise levels from trains and aircraft,
or on radiation losses from nuclear plants. What emerged on
the one hand as a powerful and practical tool for environmental
management, on the other hand became a major constraint for
industrial operations and a driving force for technological
development. Especially in the energy sector standards began
to shape long- and short-term decisions, ranging from operational
decisions about singel plants to long-term planning decisions
about optimal energy mixes. The influence of standards on
energy systems development has been studied within IIASA's
Energy Systems Program for example for radiation standards,
S02 standards, particulates, etc. But standards also had more
subtle effects, which were not always intended and seldom fore-
seen. Car emission standards turned out to increase fuel con-
sumption, a fact which was particularly highlighted during the
energy crisis. Restricting pollution from one source (for
example, hydrocarbon emission from cars) tended to produce
more pollution of another kind (for example, sulphuric acid
mist). Restricting risks of one kind (for example, population
risks) tended to increase risks of another kind (for example,
occupational risks).
When in the mid-seventies these adverse effects and incon-
sistencies of standards were felt, government officials,
environmental managers, and researchers began to ask new
challenging questions: How well do standards fulfill the role
of mediating between environment and development interests?
How much do standards cost the economy, and how much does the
public benefit from standards? And finally: How good are
regulatory procedures for the establishment of standards? The
answers seldom turned out to be encouraging. Environmental
managers and researchers are especially critical of the quality
of standard setting procedures. Anecdotal evidence of arbi-
trary numerical standard levels are not uncommon. But if such
irrationalities are obvious and easy to discard, the under-
lying reasons for the seemingly poor quality of standard setting
procedures lie in the enormous difficulties which standard
setting agencies typically face:
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There usually exists a substantial uncertainty
about the effects of pollutants on human health
and well-being. Experts often differ widely in
their estimates or are unwilling to make judg-
ments because of a lack of information;
standards have to be set in the light of con-
flicting objectives such as environmental, eco-
nomic, engineering, and political objectives.
Many of these objectives are hard to quantify,
and few are commensurable;
The regulator is seldom a single decision maker,
but usually various administrative units and ex-
perts interact in the decision making process,
often confronting each other with different values
and opinions. In addition, different groups with
conflicting interests are affected by standards;
Effects of pollution and regulations are distributed
unevenly over time. Crucial trade-offs have to
be made between costs and benefits today and costs
and benefits in the future.
Realizing these difficulties the Volkswagenwerk Foundation
project on "Procedures for the Establishment of Standards" was
initiated in 1975 as a joint effort of the Nuclear Research
Center, Karlsruhe, FRG, and the International Institute of
Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria. The objectives
of this research were to analyze existing procedures for stan-
dard setting, and to develop new techniques for improving stan-
dard setting procedures. An initial literature survey soon
revealed that such a project stepped into relatively unexplored
territory, and progress was therefore necessarily slow, partic-
ularly in the initial phase of the study. Several possible
research directions were identified:
legal studies;
environmental economics;
policy analysis;
cost-benefit analysis;
simulation and simulation gaming;
decision theory;
game theory.
Based mainly on the expertise of the researchers involved in the
study, several initial decisions for shaping the research were
made: First, standard setting procedures were to be studied at
the hand of actual cases in close cooperation with environ-
mental decision makers. Second, two main lines of research
were to be performed: policy analyses of past or ongoing
standard setting processes with a largely problem oriented and
descriptive focus; and development and application of decision
and game theoretic models for standard setting with a more
normative emphasis.
The policy analyses were meant to provide the case material
to describe how standards are presently set, to identify problem
areas in standard setting, and to provide inputs to the decision
and game theoretic models. A policy analysis framework was
elaborated and applied to two standard setting cases: chronic
oil discharges from North Sea oil production platforms, and
noise standards for Shinkansen trains in Japan. In each case
in-depth interviews were held with the main participants in the
standard setting process focusing on the three main actor groups
which the policy analysis framework identified as the key
actors in standard setting: the regulator group, the developer
(producer) group, and the impactee group.
The two cases turned out to be quite different in character.
Chronic oil discharges were essentially set on the basis of
equipment availability, costs, and performance. The reason
for this technical orientation in standard setting was that
biological information on the effects of low -level hydrocarbon
concentrations in the seas is still very sparse. Noise stan-
dards for Shinkansen trains, on the other hand, were set almost
exclusively on the basis of noise complaint relationships with
the intention to set the noise standard at a level where the
number of complaints remains small. Available technical and
cost data were more or less ignored. This difference reflects
differences in the national definitions of standards and the
legal basis on which standards are issued. While chronic oil
discharges in the United Kingdom were set on the basis of the
"best practical means" principle, noise standards in Japan were
set as environmental quality standards, i.e., targets or
desirable goals for the future without direct binding force.
Other definitions include, for example the "best applicable
means" definition used in Norway, or the "best available
technology" definition used in the U.S. Such definitions
together with the different institutional setups and political
constraints in standard setting procedures appear to shape
the outcome of standard setting procedures substantially.
A decision theoretic model was developed that directly
relates to the given standard setting cases of chronic oil
discharges and noise. The model is a one-stage three-decision-
maker model which comprises the decision making of a regula-
tor, a developer, and an impactee unit. The purpose of the
model is to provide a structure, a language, and quantification
and analysis tools for regulatory agencies to use when perform-
ing standard setting tasks. The model assumes that the regu-
lator announces his standard r, and then determines an optimal
decision d(r) of the developer in response to the standard. The
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impactees in turn are assumed to respond to the developer
decision d(r) with an optimal response a[d(r)]. This triple
of decisions, together with the associated utilities UR, UD, and
UA accruing to the three decision units, allows to explore the
relative benefits of standards from the point of view of all
parties affected before actual decisions are made.
This model was applied to setting chronic oil discharge
standards for North Sea oil production platforms. A detailed
expected utility model was constructed to determine the optimal
treatment response of the developer (oil company) to a standard
set by the United Kingdom's Department of Energy, considering
equipment cost and performance, and probability estimates of
possible detections of regulation violations and sanctions.
Results include that the developer response to standards is
controlled by cutoff points along the standard measure. These
cutoff points are determined almost exclusively by the perfor-
mance uncertainty of equipment, and the regulator's monitoring
and inspection procedure. Penalties and risk attitudes incor-
porated in the developer model did not change the cutoff points
substantially. Further analyses of the three utility functions
of the regulator, developer, and impactee show that there are
many dominated standards, where the regulator's utility domi-
nates the utilities of the developer and the impactee. This
result is typical when the regulator's decision (i.e. the
standard) is discrete, and the impactees are considered
sufferers. Non-dominated standards tend to cluster around
cutoff points. Another result is that a standard is not equal
to a standard. Standards with the same numerical value can
have quite different economic implications, depending on exter-
nal conditions (performance uncertainty of the treatment) and
the monitoring and inspection procedure of the regulator.
The multistage nature of standard setting processes with the
possibility of learning and adaptation and the possible multiple
interactions between the decision makers were not explicitly
considered in the decision theoretic model. In order to over-
come these limitations a multistage game theoretic model was
developed which is also based on the three generic decision
units. In contrast to the single-stage decision model, how-
ever, the game theoretic model treats multiple stages in which
the transitions from one stage to another are probabilistic,
either because of probabilistic changes in the environment, or
because of probabilistic responses of the players involved in
the standard setting. The purpose of the game theoretic model
is to parametrically explore the possible futures of standard
setting procedures under given solution concepts. The model
was applied to C02 standards and to noise standards for Shinkan-
sen trains. Since the model uses highly aggregated and simpli-
fied utility functions and transition probabilities, no precise
behavioral implications or recommendations can be drawn. How-
ever, the model results do provide a structure for exploring
extreme reactions of the players and reactions to regulation
(for example, compromise offers for noise standards to avoid
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a law suit). In addition the model points out differences in
the optimal strategies depending on the game theoretic solu-
tion concept (for example, equilibrium points, or Pareto
optimality), and allows the regulator to explore consequences
of his regulation and the reactions of players under different
solution concepts.
The results of these studies were presented together with
research approaches of other environmental study groups at
a workshop held at the International Institute for Applied
Systems Analysis at Laxenburg in May 1978. The purpose of this
workshop was to identify major problem areas in standard
setting, to review the usefulness and limits of formal approaches
to setting standards, and to make recommendations to regulatory
agencies about improvements of standard setting.
Uncertainty, conflict, and institutional constraints
emerged as the main areas of regulatory concern in standard
setting. Particularly the problems of evaluatinq research, of
quantifying and summarizing information in a format useful for
regulatory decision making, and of conflicting opinions and
values were identified as the main obstacles in standard setting.
In addition the statutory framework for standard setting, inter-
national and national regulations, and institutional constraints
were considered by regulators to be limiting factors in standard
setting, which often force the regulator to make legalistic
and political decisions rather than decide on the basis of
scientific evidence.
Our studies identified several possible uses and limita-
tions of the three analytical approaches (policy analysis,
decision theory, game theory) used. A summary of the main
conclusions is shown in the Table following. The last row in
the Table indicates where in the standard setting process such
approaches could be used to improve standard setting. Of course,
these recommendations to use policy analysis, decision theory,
and game theory in standard setting procedures are not meant
to be exclusive. Other approaches such as cost-benefit analy-
sis, gaming and simulation models should be further explored.
In addition the question of institutional changes matching such
methodological improvements arises. For example, decision and
game theoretic models could be used on an experimental basis
in "standard setting laboratories", in which regulators,
developers, and impactees would interact at the hand of models
before they take their final decisions. Other institutional
innovations such as science courts and public participation
should also be considered in the light of the methodologies
available. The problem of striking a match between methodological
improvements in decision making and the institutional and political
reality (as well as necessary changes in institutions) could be
a major focus of such future research.
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